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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Trustee's Duty to Search for Tax Claims-Defendant
was trustee of a bankrupt estate which, prior to its bankruptcy, owed $8,ooo.
in taxes to the State of Delaware. The trustee was not aware of the tax claim,
nor was the state aware of the bankruptcy. Before either learned these facts,
the assets of the estate, sufficient in amount to pay the tax according to its
priority, were distributed to the other creditors. Held, that the trustee was not
personally liable to the state.' Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 92 F. (2d) 17
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
The instant case is the first decision of an appellate court on the question
of the duty of a trustee in bankruptcy to inquire as to the tax claims accruing
prior to the bankruptcy. One district court has ruled on the question and de-
clared that no such duty existed.' However, confusion continued on the matter
since both lower and appellate courts before and since that case declared, in
dicta, that there was such a duty.3  Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 4 has
been used as authority for the dicta, and was relied upon by the state in the
instant case.5  However, the expressed purpose of this Section was to give
priority to tax claims.6 Section 47 of the Act is devoted to an enumeration of
the trustee's duties, and the duty of inquiry which the state sought to impose is
not included.7 The use of the dicta might possibly be explained as showing a
tendency on the part of courts to accentuate the preeminent position held by tax
claims in bankruptcy proceedings. 8 Just how active a part the government
must take in securing payment from the funds of the estate is not clear.9 At
least, it is well settled that it need not prove a tax claim as an ordinary creditor.10
There seems to be doubt as to what effect the failure to file a claim will have on
payment from the estate." But regardless of what effect lack of notice may
have upon the estate, it would seem manifestly unjust to impose upon the trustee
an insurer's liability for non-payment of unknown tax claims. 2 Thus, the
court is to be commended for taking a practical view of the matter. A contrary
holding would require an inquiry by the trustee into all the possible municipal,
i. The court expressly refused to commit itself as to the trustee's liability if he had had
constructive notice. In Dallas v. Menezes, 16 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) it was held
that the trustee was liable if he had constructive notice.
2. United States v. Eyges, 286 Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923).
3. See Standard v. Dayton, 22o Fed. 441, 444 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; Carbon County v.
Lee, 36 F. (2d) 218, 219 (C. C. A. ioth, 1929) ; In re Servil, 45 F. (2d) 66o, 661 (D. Idaho
193o) ; In re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276, 277 (D. N. D. 19o6) ; In re Montgomery & Son, 17 F. (2d)
404, 4o6 (N. D. Ohio 1927).
4. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), 1I U. S. C. A. § Io4 (a) (1927).
5. The state also based its case on the failure of the trustee to secure a bar-order re-
quiring it to file its claim. As the court points out, bar-orders are to provide a prompt
method for the payment of taxes, and do not bear on the duty to search for them. See Shinn
v. Milbourne, 78 F. (2d) 74o, 741 (App. D. C. '935).
6. The heading of this Section in the Act is "Debts Which Have Priority". 30 STAT.
563 (1898). This Section has been amended to take care of other situations which also were
not relevant to the establishment of a duty. See Historical Note, ii U. S. C. A. § 104 (1927).
7. 30 STAT. 557 (I898), amended by 32 STAT. 799 (19o3) and 36 STAT. 840 (1g9o), ii U.
S. C. A. § 75 (1927).
8. In re Chandler Motors, 17 F. (2d) 998 (D. Mass. 1926), 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 92
(1927) ; COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (3th ed. I923) i44o.
9. BRowmE BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PROCEDURE (1930) 78.
Io. In re Prince & Walter, 131 Fed. 546 (M. D. Pa. 1904) ; 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 92
(1927); COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (W3th ed. 1923) 1446.
1i. See In re Brezen, 297 Fed. 300, 302 (D. N. J. 1924).
12. See U. S. v. Kaplan, 4 F. Supp. 563 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
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county, state, and national tax claims against the estate. Such an investigation,
besides requiring a disproportionate amount of time,13 might well become para-
mount to the principal duty of the trustee, that of making the bankrupt estate
available to the general creditors. 14
Bills and Notes-Effect of Indorsement to Impostor in Face-to-Face
Transaction-The holder of a check, in order to effect an assignment of a
certain condemnation award, indorsed it to an impostor who purported to be the
assignor, and who subsequently transferred it to an innocent purchaser for
value. Held (Hubbs and Crane, JJ., dissenting), that in the absence of prior
dealings between the parties, although it was a face-to-face transaction, the inten-
tion of the holder was to pass title to the check only to the person whom the
impostor purported to be, and that therefore the loss must fall on the innocent
purchaser. Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399, io N. E. (2d) 457
(1937).
With this decision, New York has, in effect, adopted in part the minority
rule as set out in Tolman v. American National Bank.' Under this rule, since
the instrument is not payable to the impostor, the subsequent indorsement by
him of his assumed name is therefore a forgery and, under § 23 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law,2 passes no right to the instrument. This places the loss on
the innocent transferee from the impostor. On the other hand, the overwhelm-
ing majority 3 holds that "physical presence is a surer means of identification
than a designated name", 4 and that, therefore, it should be presumed, in the
absence of any expressed intention, that the intent of the maker was to make the
instrument payable to the man before him.5 Under this presumption, since the
impostor is the intended payee, he gets a voidable title to the instrument. There-
13. The court in the instant case pointed out that it would not be so "harsh" where the
tax claim was by the state of incorporation, as here, but that it would be "most oppressive"
where the claims are for multitudinous taxes by many states, counties, or municipalities.
14. See Bunch v. Maloney, 233 Fed. 967, 969 (C. C. A. 8th, ig6).
1. 22 R. I. 462, 48 AUt. 480 (igoi). Accord: Miners & Merchants Bank v. St. Louis
Smelting & Refining Co., 178 S: W. 211 (Mo. 1915); Keel v. Wynne, 21o N. C. 426, 187
S. E. 571, Note (1936) 15 N. C. L. Rav. 186; Rolling v. El Paso & S. W. Ry., 127 S. W.
302 (Tex. Civ. App. igio) ; Simpson v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 43 Utah 1o5, 134 Pac. 883
(1913) ; see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) 306; BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW WITH COMMENTS AND CRITIClSM (1908) 128.
2. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 39, § 42.
3. Ryan v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, io6 Cal. App. 690, 289 Pac. 863
(i93o) ; Land Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 211 Pa. 211, 6o Ati. 723 (1905) ;
Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Calif., 18o Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135 (935). In addition,
numbered among the majority are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon. New York was formerly thought to have adopted this view. The
rule of intent was set up in Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 44i (1917). It
was stated to apply to a bills and notes situation in Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank,
235 N. Y. 68, 71, 138 N. E. 739, 740 (1923). In First Nat. Bank v. American Exch. Nat.
Bank, 49 App. Div. 349, 63 N. Y. Supp. 58 (ist Dep't, igoo) where there were prior dealings
by correspondence, the court applied the majority rule. For exhaustive list of cases adopting
this view, see 5 U. L. A. (1936) § 23, p. 167. For a general discussion, see Notes (1930) 35
Dicic. L. REv. 90, (1920) 34 HAv. L. REV. 76.
4. Justice Lehman, in instant case at 411.
5. Where the dealings are not face-to-face but are by correspondence, etc., the split is
naturally much more pronounced. Among those holding that title passes are Boatsman v.
Stockmen's Nat. Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914); Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank &
Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. io8o (1923) ; Emporia Nat. Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360,
ix Pac. 141 (1886). Contra: Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun 317 (N. Y. 1876) ; Mercantile Nat. Bank
v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (ist Dep't, igII), aff'd, 21o N. Y. 567,
1o4 N. E. 1134 (1914).
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fore, his subsequent indorsement is not a forgery, and it passes a valid title,
protecting innocent purchasers thereafter.6 This result would seem to be more
desirable commercially, since it fosters ready negotiation without requiring ex-
tensive inquiry into the identity of the parties. Furthermore, it would seem
more just that the loss fall on the drawer whose credulity made the fraud pos-
sible.7  Nevertheless, the New York court refused to apply the majority rule,
on the ground that the transferor had had no prior dealings or negotiations with
the impostor." Concededly, it is more probable that one intends to pass title to
the man in front of him if he has dealt with him previously, and especially if
this act of transfer is the culmination of the prior negotiations. However, no
other courts among the majority have required this additional factorY Their
decisions as to the intention of the transferor have been influenced fundamentally
by commercial policy and by the desire to protect those who least merit the loss.
It is difficult, therefore, to understand why New York, the center of commercial
activity, should depart, even to this limited extent, from the more practical and
equitable majority rule.
Building and Loan Associations-Priority Between Creditors of Con-
stituent and Those of Merged Association-Building and loan association
A merged with association B to produce association C. Thereafter C merged
with D to produce E. D was without assets and was incorporated with the sole
purpose of effecting the second merger. The Secretary of Banking took pos-
session of B. Exceptions to the distribution of assets were filed by certain
stockholders not assenting to the merger producing C, by others not assenting
to the merger producing E, and by two who had reduced their claims to judg-
ment following the second merger. All had given notice of withdrawal. Held,
that distribution should be as follows: first, judgment creditors;' second, non-
assentors to the first merger; and third, non-assentors to the second merger.
In re Wilson B. & L. Ass'n, Phila. C. P. Ct. No. 5, Phila. Legal Inteligencer,
Sept. 23, 1937, P. 8, col. I-
In the instant case, a Pennsylvania court for the first time has decided the
complicated question of priority between creditors of constituent building and
loan associations and creditors of the resulting association in a merger.3 Inasmuch
6. Fraud by impersonation is met in much the same manner in other branches of the law.
Ludwurska v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 577, 178 Atl. 28 (1935) (contract) ; 2
WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 635; Ashley, Mutual Assent in Contract (1903) 3 CoL.
L. REv. 71.
7. This is another doctrine used to support the majority rule, and it approximates an
estoppel. Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S. W. 895 (1924).
8. The court said that the requirement as to prior dealings had been laid down by them
in Halsey v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 27o N. Y. 134, 2oo N. E. 671 (1936). However,
there is no mention of prior dealings in that opinion, and no evidence of them in the facts.
9. Some courts following the majority rule where there were no prior dealings are Mis-
souri Pac. R. R. v. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S. W. 895 (1924) ; Milner v. First Nat. Bank
of Waynesboro, 38 Ga. App. 668, 145 S. E. 1oi (1928). Contra: Rolling v. El Paso & S. W.
Ry., 127 S. W. 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 19IO).
I. One of the judgment creditors recovered judgment following the second merger with-
out an amendment to her statement of claim suggesting the merger. Therefore, since her
judgment was against association C, it could not bind real estate of E. Thus, this creditor
fell into the third class.
2. Exceptions filed.
3. See Weinroth v. Homer B. & L. Ass'n, 310 Pa. 265, 272, 165 AtI. 28, 30 (933) where
the court refused to pass on this problem. See also PENNSYLVANIA BANKING AND BUILDING
& LOAN CODES ANNOTATED (1933) § ioiiB, n. 14.
RECENT CASES
as none of these exceptants perfected their withdrawals, 4 they were non-assenting
shareholders.5 They thereby became creditors of the merged association to the
formation of which they objected.6 Thus, those exceptants who did not assent
to the first merger became creditors of association C which subsequently entered
into the second merger. Likewise those who did not assent to the second
merger became creditors of the resulting association E. However, the non-
assentors to the first merger were creditors before the non-assentors to the
second merger. Pennsylvania permits creditors of a constituent to trace its
assets into the merged association and there assert their claims.7  Since D was
a dummy without assets, the non-assentors to the first merger can automatically
trace the assets of C into the resulting association E, and therefore should have
priority over the non-assentors to the second merger. However, non-assentors
to the second merger are creditors of association E 8 and therefore any of them
who reduced their claims to judgment must be accorded the preference shown a
judgment creditor.9 Since the court held that the new Department of Banking
Code '0 did not control this liquidation, its construction of the section of the
Act dealing with the order of distribution 11 is dictum. However, the court by
its construction would reach a similar result under the Code, since it held that
the word "shareholder" in sub-section 4 of § ioII B referred to the association
being liquidated. Inasmuch as none of the exceptants assented to the merger
producing association E, they never became shareholders of it, and so would fall
within sub-section 3 of § ioi B of the Code.' 2  Thus, while the case leaves
untouched many of the difficult problems in this field, 13 and is limited in its
application to cases where actual or automatic tracing of the assets of the con-
stituent into the resulting association is possible, it does reach a sound result in
settling a new question.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) fit. 15, § 99I, 992; Brown v. Victor B. & L. Ass'n,
302 Pa. 254, 153 Atl. 349 (93), 79 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 802. For a complete discussion of the
status of a withdrawing shareholder see Freedman, The Right of Withdrawal from Building
and Loan Associations it Pennsylvania (1930) 5 TEMP. L. Q. 79.
5. Under the Building and Loan Code, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. .5,
§ 1o74-oog, a shareholder who fails to file an objection within twenty days after a merger is
conclusively presumed to have assented thereto. Prior to the Code, a non-assentor or dis-
senter could sue any time within six years. Nice Ball Bearing Co. v. Mortgage B. & L.
Ass'n, 310 Pa. 56o, 166 Atl. 239 (933), 8I U. OF PA. L. REV. 872; see Gorges v. Greater
Adelphi B. & L. Ass'n, 322 Pa. 569, 574, 185 Atl. 815, 817 (1936).
6. Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 Atl. 912 (i9o7); Friedman v.
Southern Co-op. B. & L. Ass'n, 1o4 Pa. Super. 514, 159 Adt. 8o (1932) ; SUNDHME, LAw OF
BUIrDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) § 39 (a).
7. Merwine v. Mount Pocono Light & Imp. Co., 304 Pa. 517, ,56 Atl. 150 (1931) ; Berko-
vitz's Appeal, 319 Pa. 397, 179 Atl. 746 (935) ; 15 FLETCrER, CoapoRATioxs (Perm. ed.
1932) § 7r28.
8. Supra note 6.
9. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 973.
io. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. c936) tit. 71, § 733.
ii. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 71, §733-1o0iB: ". • . Third. Any
claim of a creditor of the association, other than the claim of a shareholder arising from his
ownership of shares.
"Fourth. Any claim of a shareholder . . . arising from his ownership of shares ..
12. Counsel for the Secretary of Banking contended that non-assenting shareholders were
included in sub-section 4 of § ioiiB. See instant case at col. 2.
13. For example, in the merger of three groups, the assets of only one being traceable,
what are the priorities? Likewise, where there can be only partial tracing of the assets, will
the person tracing lose all priority or retain it partially? In addition, do business creditors
of a constituent take equally with non-assenting shareholder creditors of a constituent in case
of two or more mergers?
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Constitutional Law-Validity of Act Authorizing Appointive School
Board to Levy Taxes-The School Code of Pennsylvania authorizes the
Philadelphia School Board to levy taxes sufficient in amount (I) to cover
minimum salaries and increments of teachers and supervisory staff as well as
contributions to the teachers' retirement system, (2) to pay interest on and
retire indebtedness, and (3) from an expressly limited sum, to pay all other
expenses.: Plaintiff sought to enjoin the levy of such taxes. Held, that an
injunction should issue, since the Act embodied an unconstitutional delegation
of the taxing power to a non-representative body, but that because of the
emergency created thereby, the decree of the lower court should be modified to
permit the present tax rate to continue for two years. Wilson v. School District
of Philadelphia, Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Nov. 17, 1937, p. 6,
col. I.
The fundamental principle of constitutional law that legislative power cannot
be delegated is peculiarly applicable to taxation. 2  In state government, there is
an exception permitting delegation to municipal corporations,3 which, like the
legislature, are representative bodies.4 However, the majority of jurisdictions,
including Pennsylvania, have not included school districts within this sphere.5
Therefore, if the instant provision embodied a delegation, it would ordinarily be
void.6 But it is an established principle in Pennsylvania that if, in authorizing
a school district to tax, the legislature imposes adequate restrictions, there is in
reality no substantial delegation.7  Applying this principle, the court declared
that the second and third provisions of the Section were adequately restrictive. s
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 24, § 562. The decision in the lower court had
declared unconstitutional both the 1929 (ibid.) and 1921 (Pa. Laws 1921, p. 328) amend-
ments of the Section. The 1919 amendment (Pa. Laws 1919, p. 555) of the same provision,
however, was permitted to stand, since it placed an absolute maximum restriction (6 to 8Yi
mills) on the amount of the tax to be levied, and thus came within the rule of Minsinger v.
Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 84 Atl. 9o2 (1912).
2. Q'Neil v. Insurance Co., 166 Pa. 72, 3o Atl. 945 (895) ; Shultes v. Eberle, 82 Ala.
242, 2 So. 345 (1886) ; see I COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 74; WHITE CONSTITUTION
OF PENNSYLVANIA (1907) 173.
3. Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. 448 (1873) ; Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225 (1877) ; see
I COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 389.
4. However, the Philadelphia Board of School Directors is appointed by the judges of
the Courts of Common Pleas. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 24, § 162. In several cases
where delegation of taxing power to school districts was upheld, without reference to definite
restrictions placed thereon, the directors were elected. E. g., Wharton v. School Directors,
42 Pa. 358 (1862) ; Duff v. Perry Twp. School District, 281 Pa. 87, 126 AtI. 202 (1924). On
this ground, the instant court distinguished the former cases. But cf. A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (935) (unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to the President).
5. Long v. Cheltenham Twp. School District, 269 Pa. 472, 112 AtI. 545 (1921) (tort);
see I DILLON, MUNICn'AL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §§ 34, 36, 37, and cases cited at 62,
1. 3. .However, Pennsylvania school districts are corporate bodies, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 24, § 30. Since the functions administered by the School Board are fundamentally
governmental (PA. CoNsT. art. X, § I), and are closely associated with the interests of the
municipality in which it is located, it would seem that it might reasonably have been treated
as a municipal corporation. Cf. Goldstein v. School District, C. P. Ct. No. 5, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Nov. 12, 1937, p. 12, col. I (tort liability). The instant court, in a footnote,
distinguishes cities from school districts on the basis of the extent of their respective powers.
6. For a discussion of this principle see Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non
Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law (1928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 168, 173.
7. Minsinger v. Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 84 AtI. 902 (1912) (maximum amount stated).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 24, § 562. As to the second provision, the indebt-
edness incurred by a school district is absolutely limited. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 24, § 421. The third is self-restrictive in amount.
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But the first provision, though it restricted the levy to an amount sufficient to
pay the minimum salaries and increments of teaching and supervisory staffs, did
not limit the number of the personnel thereof. Thus, the Board was free to levy
taxes sufficient to maintain as large a staff as it deemed necessary." Since the
three items are taken together to determine the tax rate, the total tax is unre-
stricted, and hence the entire Section was declared unconstitutional.1 0 The
propriety of the conclusion depends upon the interpretation of another Section of
the Act which provides that the Board ". . . shall employ the necessary
qualified teachers to keep the public schools open... ,, 1 Even if this be con-
strued to mean "only the necessary teachers", discretion is left to the Board to
determine what number is necessary. However, there is a factual limitation on
the number of teachers necessary to administer the school system, and it does
not seem possible that the courts would permit a clear abuse of the Board's
discretion in this regard.' 2 But the court rejected any argument along this line
by contending that the courts are not prepared to bear the burden of investigat-
ing matters of educational policy. Not so easily circumvented was the argu-
ment that American Ball Club of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia'5 governed the
instant situation. The court distinguished that case on the ground that there
the delegation was merely one of administrative details. It would seem, how-
ever, that the difference between determining the number of policemen necessary
to patrol a ball park and the number of teachers necessary to administer a school
system, is one primarily of degree rather than of kind. Conceding this differ-
ence in degree, it would nevertheless seem that the ground of the court's distinc-
tion was unfortunate.
To meet the emergency 4 created by its decision until the convening of the
legislature, however, the court, under two statutes, invoked what it observed to
be a general power of equity to stay operation of the injunction.' 5  One Act
permits ". . . prevention or restraint of . . . acts contrary to law and
prejudicial to the interests of the community. ,,;16 the other the power
. . . to enter such judgment, order or decree . . . as . . . [it] may deem
proper and just. . . ."1 '7 This construction would seem never to have been
intended by the legislature. The latter provision is interpreted so broadly as to
remove any restriction on the power of the court. The former is employed inac-
9. PA. STAT. AN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 24, § 1121.
io. But cf. Duff v. Perry Twp. School District, 281 Pa. 87, 126 Atl. 2o2 (1924), cited
supra note 4.
In addition the court thought that there was a violation of PA. CONST. art. III, § 20,
which, inter alia, prohibits delegation of the tax power to any special commission.
ii. PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 24, § M12I.
12. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that the exercise of discretion by school
authorities will be interfered with only when clearly abused. See Lamb v. Redding, 234 Pa.
481, 484, 83 AUt. 362, 363 (1912) ; Hibbs v. Arensberg, 276 Pa. 24, I19 AtI. 727, 728 (1923).
13. 312 Pa. 311, 167 At. 89i (1933) (ordinance requiring payment of fee for each police-
man deemed necessary by director of public safety to patrol contests, held not unlawful dele-
gation; Maxey, J., dissenting).
14. The principal practical objection to the lower court's ruling was that it might have
deprived the School Board of sufficient funds to run the schools, thereby forcing not only the
closing of some of them, but a violation of the TuAcnERs' TENURE AcT, Pa. Laws 1937, Act
no. 52.
i5. Equity courts have the power to modify or stay 'the operation of a final decree.
Mootry v. Grayson, 1O4 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 9th, i9oo) ; Totten v. Totten, 299 Ill. 43, 132
N. E. 277 (1921) ; Cadotte v. Cadotte, 12o Mich. 667, 79 N. W. 932 (1899). But as regards
constitutional questions thif seems to be limited. See infra note ig.
i6. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. i7, § 282 (italics supplied).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § Ioo.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
curately, since the court is not giving relief as to an unlawful act,18 but by its
decree is sanctioning a continuation of what it has declared to be a violation of
the constitution. The one case it cites to sustain its point gives rise to the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of its own action under the "due process" clause of
the Federal Constitution. 19 The court, in effect, has legislated to provide a
temporary means of relief from its own ruling. In view of the harmful effects
of an unmodified ruling, however, the solution is not inequitable. It is tem-
porary, it affords relief to the School Board, and works no undue hardship on
the taxpayer.2 ° But it must be conceded that the court is, in effect, exercising
the very power to tax which it forbids to the School Board. The necessity for a
special session of the legislature to provide relief would seem less objectionable
than the establishment of such a dangerous precedent.
Constitutional Law-Validity of Licensing Provisions of the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act-Defendant, a dealer, shipped several carloads of
oranges in interstate commerce without having applied for a pro rata shipping
allotment under an order issued pursuant to the applicable provisions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act.' The United States was granted a permanent
injunction restraining him from violating the order issued under the Act. De-
fendant appeals on the ground that the licensing provisions are invalid. Held,
that the marketing provisions of the AAA are a constitutional exercise of the
federal commerce power.2 Edwards v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937)-
Since the Supreme Court invalidated the taxing and appropriating provi-
sions of the AAA as a concerted plan to regulate agricultural production,8 the
18. The only possible support for the court's construction under this section would seem
to be that by its decree it is preventing a violation of the TACHERs' TENuRE AcT, Pa. Laws
1937, Act no. 52 (see supra note 14; or that the "and" in the Statute is disjunctive. Both
of these arguments seem far-fetched.
ig. Sinking Fund Comm'rs of Phila. v. Philadelphia, 324 Pa. 129, 188 At. 314 (1936)
(constitutional provisions against the impairment of the obligations of contracts relate solely
to legislative enactments and not to decisions of the courts). Accord: Kryger v. Wilson, 242
U. S. 17, (igi6). But the Sinking Fund case, supra at 133, 188 Atl. at 317, observes that the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the decisions of the courts. Ac-
cord: Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, z66 U. S. 226 (897). The ruling of the instant
court deprives the taxpayer of his property under an Act which embodies an unconstitutional
delegation of the taxing power. It would seem, therefore, to fall within this clause.
20. In a dictum the instant court stated: (i) Taxpayers cannot recover taxes paid the
School District under the unconstitutional Act unless paid under protest of unconstitutionality.
Cf. Philadelphia & Reading C. & 0. Co. v. Tamaqua Boro. School District, 304 Pa. 489, 156
AtI. 75 (193). (2) Delinquent taxpayers will be forced to pay taxes charged to them. City
of Sebring v. Wolf, 805 Fla. 516, 141 So. 736 (1932). Though there seem to be no Pennsyl-
vania cases on this point, the view taken is an equitable one.
i. The preamble sets forth that the severe disparity between agricultural prices and
those of other commodities has resulted in obstructing the free flow of interstate commerce in
agricultural commodities. Therefore, the declared policy is to increase agricultural prices
until they reach a level which gives the farmer the purchasing power he enjoyed in the pre-
war period. The Secretary of Agriculture, through marketing agreements with the
merchants, called handlers, and through his agents in the districts, is to regulate in a pre-
scribed manner the proportionate amount of each commodity (fruits, vegetables, etc.) per
dealer which may be shipped in interstate commerce. 48 STAT. 3 (934) ; 48 STAT. 32, as
amended in, 49 STAT. 750, 751 (935) ; 48 STAT. 34, as amended in, 48 STAT. 528, 49 STAT.
753, 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 6oi, 6o2, 6o8 (b) (c) (Supp. 1936).
2. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 8 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 547.
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status of the marketing provisions of that enactment has been uncertain. The
present court in a terse statement dismissed the contention that the Butler deci-
sion voided the entire Act.4 Although the difficulties in supporting this view-
point are greater than appeared to the court,5 it seems to have arrived at the
better result, 6 in view of the separability clause 7 and the fact that the marketing
provisions and the taxing provisions are distinct types of regulation." As to the
validity of the marketing provisions in themselves, the court's sustaining this
use of the police power over interstate commerce to ameliorate economic evils
demoralizing national commerce, although without direct precedent, seems
sound.9 If Congress may close interstate channels to immoral or harmful
goods,10 it is not a great extension to hold that it may regulate in a reasonable
manner the quantity merchants may ship in national commerce in order to
prevent the economic destruction of that commerce through low prices."1 Further-
more, in view of the recent trend in the Supreme Court, as exemplified in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.," the accom-
panying effect on intrastate commerce and production, always a matter of degree,
will probably not be considered the paramount purpose of the Act so as to render
it invalid. Finally, the holding that Congress has not delegated its legislative
power to the executive department is supported, as this court points out, 3 by
the closer relationship the standards fixed by this Act bear to those upheld in
Hampton & Co. v. United States'4 than they bear to the unlimited delegatory
4. Instant case at 789.
5. The Butler case decided that any concerted plan by Congress to regulate agricultural
production was invalid, even though the means used were within the powers granted to Con-
gress. Therefore, according to one interpretation, all parts of that program must necessarily
fall with the plan itself. Ganley v. Wallace, 17 F. Supp. 115 (D. D. C. 1936) ; Fosgate Co.
v. Kirkland, ig F. Supp. 152 (S. D. Fla. 1937). See also the sweeping language of Justice
Roberts in the Butler case, 297 U. S. 1, 64 (1936). On the other hand, the conclusion that
the Act is a concerted plan to regulate agriculture might well be different if the Act were
limited, as it now is, in effect, to the licensing provisions.
6. United States v. David Buttrick Co., 91 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937), cert. denied,
U. S. Sup. Ct, Nov. 8, 1937; United States v. Goldsmith Fruit Co., ig F. Supp. 147 (S. D.
Fla. 1937). For contra authority, see cases cited supra note 5, and district court opinion in
United States v. David Buttrick Co., 15 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1936). Note, however, that
the latter case was decided before the Jones & Laughlin case.
7. 48 STAT. 39 (1934), 7 U. S. C. A. § 614 (Supp. 1936). This clause creates a presump-
tion that the legislature intended distinct parts of the Act to be applicable independent of
other invalid provisions. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1928).
8. Ibid.; see Stem, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court (1937)
51 HAv. L. REV. 76.
9. See Corwin, Congress' Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitutional Issue
(1933) 18 CoaR. L. Q. 477; Cousens, The Use of the Federal Interstate Commerce Power to
Regulate Matters within States (934) 21 VA. L. REv. 51; Stem, That Commerce Which
Concerns More States Than One (934) 47 HA v. L. REV. 1335.
io. The instant case relied mainly on Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925),
which upheld a statute punishing the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate
commerce. An even closer case is Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois C. R. R., 299 U.
S. 334 (I937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 529, upholding a statute prohibiting transportation of
goods made by convict labor into states against their policy. For a collection and discussion
of the cases concerning the police power in interstate commerce, see both cases cited supra,
and for earlier cases, Note (1917) 3o HARv. L. REV. 491.
ii. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936), especially the concurring opin-
ion of Chief Justice Hughes at 317.
12. 301 U. S. 1 (1937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 733. The present opinion asserted posi-
tively that the Jones & Laughlin case overruled the Carter case (holding the Guffey Coal
Bill unconstitutional). Instant case at 782.
13. Instant case at 785.
14. 276 U. S. 394 (1928), upholding the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 STAT. 941-943 (1922), 19
U. S. C. A. §§ 154-159 (1927), empowering the President to vary prescribed duties within
certain limitations in order to equalize foreign and domestic costs of production.
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provisions of the invalid NIRA.Y5 In the present case there is a definite goal
set up and a prescribed manner by which that goal is to be attained. In view of
these considerations, it is expected that the Supreme Court, in furtherance of its
recent liberal trend, will uphold the propositions supporting the instant case.
Equity-Doctrine of Laches as Applied to Actions by State Govern-
ment-The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought quo warranto proceed-
ings to forfeit the charters of a number of the underliers of the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company, alleging, among numerous other illegal acts, that a 999
year lease executed in 19o2 by the defendants to the P. R. T., at allegedly ex-
orbitant rentals, constituted a violation of corporate franchises granted solely
for operating purposes. From an order quashing the writ, the Commonwealth
appealed. Held (four to three), that the order was proper. Having failed to
sue for over thirty-five years, during which period the interests of innocent
investors had also intervened, the state was now barred by laches from seeking
a forfeiture of the charters.1 Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Union Traction
Co., Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 9, 1937, P. I, col. 2, petition
for re-argument denied, Pa. Sup. Ct., Nov. 13, 1937.
By the weight of American authority, in the absence of a contrary statute,2
laches may not be set up as a defense to an action brought by the government,
state 8 or federal, 4 to enforce a public right or to protect a public interest. But
where the government sues in its proprietary capacity, or as a mere formal
complainant for a private individual, such immunity will not attach.5 The
rationale behind the majority rule, as developed in the United States, reveals no
assertion of sovereign prerogative, but simply a public policy safeguarding the
interests of the state against the indolence of its agents.6 And this is so even
15. 48 STAT. 195 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 7O (Supp. 1936), held to be an invalid dele-
gation of legislative power in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), 83 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 526 (§ 9c) ; and in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.
495 ('935).
i. As a preliminary step, it was held that the lower court possessed the discretionary
power to quash a writ of quo warranto even where it issued at the instance of the Common-
wealth. The dissent was based on the ground that laches could not be imputed to the state
in the present case and that, in any event, it was error to decide the merits of the case on a
mere motion to quash.
2. E. g., OHio CODE ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 12340; State v. Miami Exporting Co., i
Ohio 126 (1841) (statute applied).
3. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Moore, 64 P. (2d) 8og (Ariz. 1937); Iansas ex rel. Boyn-
ton v. Wheat Farming Co., 137 Kan. 697, 22 P. (2d) 1093 (1933); State ex rel. King v.
Friar, I65 Okla. 145, 25 P. (2d) 620 (1933) ; State v. Vincent, 152 Ore. 2o5, 52 P. (2d) 203
(935). Contra: State v. Livingston, 164 Iowa 31, 145 N. W. 91 (1914) ; State v. Gardiner,
181 Minn. 513, 233 N. W. 16 (1g3o) ; cf. State ex rel. O'Connor v. Clay County, 271 N. W.
892 (Iowa 1937); Jackson v. Alabama & V. Ry., 172 Miss. 528, 16o So. 602 (1935). For
Pennsylvania cases contra, see infra note 8.
4. United States v. Kirkpatrick 9 Wheat. 720 (U. S. 1824); United States v. Dalles
Military Road Co., 140 U. S. 599 (1891); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U. S. 389 (1917) ; United States v. Elliot, 57 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) ; In re Cuban-
Atlantic Trans. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). In The Falcon, 19 F. (2d) lOO9
(D. Md. 1927), it was held that the general rule would not apply where the rights of inno-
cent third parties had intervened. The validity of this exception seems doubtful in view of
the peculiar facts of that case and also because of its general conflict with the theory under-
lying the Federal rule.
5. United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338 (1888) ; see French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy
Spring Co., 191 U. S. 427, 438 (19o3) ; People v. Union Elevated Ry., 269 Ill. 212, 231, 110
N. E. 1, 8 (915).
6. The classic statement is that of Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9
Wheat. 720, 735 (U. S. 1824).
RECENT CASES
though private interests may suffer thereby. The English rule remains yet to
be settled.7  As indicated by the instant decision, Pennsylvania is with the
minority denying such immunity to the state." An evaluation of the respective
doctrines must necessarily involve an election between opposing interests, well
illustrated in the present case. Here, the interests of the underliers and the
investing public conflicted with those of the general public in securing lower
fares for car riders and a more adequate return to the City of Philadelphia for
the use of its subways. In such a controversy, the welfare of the general public
should be regarded as of paramount importance. As a result of the instant
holding, the neglect of two generations of state officials has prevented an inquiry
into conditions alleged to constitute serious abuses that will continue, at public
cost, for centuries to follow. It is to be regretted that the instant court, even at
the expense of. overruling prior decisions, failed to grant to the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania the freedom of action accorded her sister states under the
majority rule.
Equity-Right of Orchestra Leader to Enforce Restriction on Broad-
casting of Orchestra's Recordings Over Radio-Waring, whose orchestra
gave performances over the radio, sought to enjoin a radio station from broadcast-
ing records I of musical selections played by his orchestra, made and sold by a
talking machine company, and bearing the legend: "Not Licensed for Radio
Broadcast". Held, that the injunction should be granted, because the plaintiff
had an enforceable common law property right in the highly artistic and unique
renditions of his orchestra, which was successfully reserved, when the records
were sold, by the restrictive legend imprinted thereon; also, because the defend-
ant's action constituted unfair competition. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc., Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, October 13, 1937, p. I,
col. 2.
In according this property interest to the plaintiff, who was unprotected by
existing copyright laws, 2 the Pennsylvania court materially extended the so-
7. Compare the conflicting statements in Attorney-General v. Sheffield Gas Consumers
Co., 3 De G. M. & G. 304, 324 (Ch. 1853) and Attorney-General v. Proprietors of the Brad-
ford Canal, L. R. 2 Eq. 71 (1866). Later English cases confess the unsettled state of the
law. See Attorney-General v. Wimbledon House Estate Co., Ltd., 2 Ch. D. 34, 42 (1904) ;
Attorney-General v. Grand Junction Canal Co., [x909] 2 Ch. 505, 517-518. For a recent at-
tempt to harmonize the cases in accordance with the prevailing American view, see 13 HALs-
BURY, LAws OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1934) 212, n. (f).
A Canadian court has expressly followed the American majority rule. Queen v. Black,
6 Can. Ex. 236 (1899).
8. Commonwealth ex tel. Atty. Gen'l v. Bala & Bryn Mawr Turnpike Co., 153 Pa. 47,
25 AtI. iio5 (1893); Commonwealth v. Reading Traction Co., 204 Pa. I5I, 53 Atl. 755
(192) ; Bailey's Estate, 241 Pa. 23o, 88 At. 428 (913) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader
v. Keystone Pipe Line Co., 39 Dauph. i (I934); cf. Bradford v. New York & Pa. T. & T.
Co., 2o6 Pa. 582, 56 AtI. 41 (1903).
It is interesting to note that the earlier decisions were in accordance with the view of
the present majority. Haehnlen v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 617 (1850); Commonwealth v.
Porter, 2Y Pa. 385 (1853) ; Commonwealth v. Philadelphia, 157 Pa. 558, 27 AtI. 553 (1893).
These cases have never been expressly overruled.
i. It should be understood that the so-called "electrical transcriptions", which are made
solely for broadcasting purposes, are not involved here.
2. The various literary and artistic productions which may be copyrighted are enumerated
in 35 STAT. 1076 (909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1927), amended by 37 STAT. 488 (1912), 17 U.
S. C. A. § 5 (1927). The statute does not recognize the right enforced in this case. But see
H. R. 1o632, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), in which a proposal is made that this right be recog-
nized.
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called "literary property right" in intellectual productions,8 hitherto confined to
musical compositions, plays, etchings and the like.4 It is not surprising that
this decision marks the first recognition of a performer's right, since the precise
problems raised in this case "have never before been presented to an American
or English court." r A rendition, in that it consummates the bare composition
and adds to it by transforming it into sound, is an intellectual production which
should be protected, just as the written song. The Pennsylvania court, in this
decision, determines to lend protection to, and thereby create a property right
in, such renditions. But, feeling that the ordinary musician's rendition does
not add enough to the written composition to be recognized as property, the
court limits the right to musicians of great and unique talent. It is true that the
ultimate test in determining whether to recognize a right in property has always
been whether or not the claimed right is of sufficient magnitude to invoke the
protection of the law.6 However, the court seems here to have drawn an unwise
and impractical line, for it would be exceedingly difficult to obtain just standards
by which to measure the "true artist". Furthermore, this distinction would
precipitate continual litigation by musicians attempting, naturally enough, to
have themselves adjudged "unique".
The instant case, in addition, constitutes the first clear-cut judicial recogni-
tion ever given to the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels.7 The restric-
tion 8 was here useful and desirable.9 For public policy did not necessitate a
denial of Waring's desire to restrict the use of his recordings, since no restraint
of trade or prohibition of alienation was involved, and without the restriction,
his right would have been lost when the records were sold.' 0 The court also
3. See DRONE, THE LAw OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES (1879) 5, 98.
4. The "literary property right" has long been recognized at common law. Ferris v.
Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (xg9I) (play); Universal Film Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1914) (photoplay); Mikado, Etc., Case, 25 Fed. 183 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1885)
(musical compositions) ; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & S. 652 (Ch. 1848) (etchings).
5. Justice Stern in instant case. It has apparently been held that no property rights can
be asserted in methods of performance. Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977 (C. C. E.
D. Pa. i9o3) (imitation of actress' rendition of song not enjoinable) ; see Chappell & Co. v.
Fields, 21o Fed. 864, 865 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914). But see Savage v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584, 585
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 19o8).
6. See Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 247 Fed. 669, 671 (C.
C. A. 4 th, 1917).
7. A few cases have purportedly recognized restrictive covenants and conditions accom-
panying the alienation of chattels. E. g., Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 28o Fed. 238 (W. D.
N. Y. 1922); In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931);
Lord Strathcona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., [1926] A. C. io8. However, in
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (928) 41 HAxv. L. REv. 945, 1013, the author con-
cludes that no square holding of a court of last resort establishes equitable servitudes on
chattels.
Although they only touched on the problem, some of the cases generally cited to sub-
stantiate the proposition that equitable servitudes will not run with chattels are: Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 21o U. S. 339 (19o8) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 22o
U. S. 373 (1911); Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8
(1918).
8. It is conjectural whether other courts would consider the legend sufficient notice of a
restriction. Under the circumstances, the words "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" seem
not prohibitive, but merely informative that license to play over the radio was not therein
given. It is probable that the defendant, who had a license from ASCAP, the assignee of
the copyright owners, to play these selections, assumed that the legend did not apply to it.
9. Equitable servitudes on lands have long been enforced. Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa.
327, 34 Atl. 663 (1896). For some alleged reasons against the existence of equitable servi-
tudes on chattels, see Chafee, loc cit. supra note 7.
io. The common law exclusive right of proprietorship extends only until the first pub-
lication. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 59r (U. S. 1834); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532
(1872). Contra: Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K. B. 1769) (early English view). With-
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ruled that the plaintiff could claim unfair competition as an additional ground
for relief.'1 The doctrine of "unfair competition" has been loosely applied in a
variety of situations,' 2 in some of which there was not even actual competition.'3
Once recognizing the plaintiff's property right in his renditions, 4 the instant
case would not seem to be extending the doctrine unduly beyond the point to
which it has been carried in the past. 5 However, use of so general a concept
would seem unnecessary in view of the main ground for the decision.
One justice, in a concurring opinion, felt that relief could have been granted
exclusively on the ground of a right of privacy invaded.' 6 The majority ignored
this suggestion, probably because this right is still tenuous, even in jurisdictions
where recognized,'7 and because of the dissimilarity of this case to prior "privacy"
out the restriction, the sale of the records would have constituted such a dissemination of
plaintiff's performance to the general public as to be within the rule that the public sale of a
book, etc., releases any intellectual property rights possessed by the creator. But cf. Univer-
sal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
ii. Justice Linn concurred on the ground of unfair competition.
12. Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. 366 (C. C. A. 4th, 1904) (competition and deception
present) ; International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918) (competi-
tion present and unfair means employed; actual deception not required) ; Peninsular Co. v.
Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) (no competition but deception present) ; Vogue
Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 3oo Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) (unfair use of property-
trade-marks) ; Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441 (922) (no
property right involved; rather, activities tending to hinder competition and create monop-
oly).
13. Peninsular Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 30o Fed. 5o9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924).
14. Courts have enjoined, as "unfair competition", the unfair use of property of persons
by others. Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 95i (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 19o9) (unauthorized
reproductions of records sold as copies of original; no deception, but sale enjoined because of
unfair taking of property). See cases cited supra note 13.
15. The parties in the instant case could not strictly be called competitors. There was no
evidence to show that WDAS attracted any advertisers sufficiently large to employ Waring's
orchestra. There was reason to believe otherwise. (But the court held that they were com-
petitors because they both furnished entertainment over the radio and received their remunera-
tion from advertisers.) There was no deception here, either, since the radio station announced
that a record was being played. This would seem to be the first case to hold that there was
unfair competition where neither direct competition nor deception was present. For, although
courts have enjoined unfair use of property of persons by defendants who were not their com-
petitors, see cases cited supra note 13, the element of deception was present in those cases.
However, in view of the lack of competition in these latter cases, and since recently it has
been stated with increasing frequency that deception is not the sine qua non of "unfair com-
petition", it would seem that no undue extension of the doctrine has been made in the instant
case. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 235 (918);
Rogers, Unfair Competition (i919) 17 MIcir. L. REv. 490; Fathchild, Static and Dynamic
Concepts of the Law of Unfair Competition (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rav. 299.
16. For definition of this right, see Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770, 299 S. W. 967,
970 (1927) ; i COOLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. 1932) § 135.
17. Great impetus was given to the development of the then undeveloped law of privacy
by a scholarly article, Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 HAV. L. REy.
193. Subsequently, complete recognition has been given to this right in some cases. E. g.,
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. i9o, 5o S. E. 68 (i9o5), 53 Am. L.
REG. 437, 18 HARv. L. REv. 625 (leading case) ; Pritchett v. Board of Comm'rs, 42 Ind. App.
3, 85 N. E. 32 (Igog) ; Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 122 Pac. 532 (i918) ; Rhodes v. Graham,
238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931), 45 Hknv. L. REV. 194; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, x15
La. 479, 39 So. 449 (i9o5) ; see Edison v. Edison Polyform and Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136,
67 Atl. 392 (Ch. 1907). However, the existence of the right was denied in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 17i N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902) ; Henry v. Cherry & Webb,
3o R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (i9o9) ; Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 69i, 117 Pac. 594
(1911), 6o U. oF PA. L. REV. 217.
These cases all involved photographs unauthorizedly published with the exception of the
Pritchett case, which involved prisoners in an adjoining jail looking through the plaintiff's
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cases. 8 In any event, the merits of applying the doctrine here are doubtful,
because there are more readily recognizable grounds for relief, and because
Waring probably lost any right of privacy he had in the recordings when he
sold them publicly.19 In retrospect, then, the court seems to have provided the
soundest ground for relief by recognizing Waring's property right in his rendi-
tions. Thus, an important step has been taken toward an enlightened view of
this problem in the United States.
Taxation-Taxability to Settlor of Three-Fourths of Income from
Trust Revocable with Consent of One of Beneficiaries-The following case
was presented to the Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
advice: A created a trust naming B, C, D, and E as beneficiaries to share equally
in the income during their lives, and their estates to share equally in the corpus
when they died. A reserved the right to revoke the trust with the consent of B.
Held, ' that so much of the trust income as relates to C, D, and E (three-fourths)
is taxable to A under §§ 166 and 167 of the Revenue Act of 1936.2 XVI Int.
Rev. Bull., No. 39, at 3 (1937).3
The theory behind taxing revocable trust income to the settlor is that he
still has control over the corpus or income, or that the one in whom the revesting
power resides is amenable to the settlor's wishes.4 The instant opinion reasoned
that B does not have a substantial adverse interest in that part of the income
relating to C, D and E; hence this portion is taxable to the settlor.5 Logically,
windows, and the Rhodes case, which involved wire tapping. For a general discussion of this
subject, see Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (932) 12 B. U. L. REV. 353, 6oo; Note (1929)
43 H~Av. L. REV. 297.
18. See supra note 17.
i9. This concurring opinion, however, is an important one in the development of the doc-
trine of the right of privacy, since it indicates that more extended application of that doctrine
may be made in the future. It is notable, also, that Justice Maxey would not limit this right
to musicians of unique talent.
i. Note that this ruling does not have the effect of a Treasury Decision. However, it
is rendered for the information of the taxpayer and lawyer as showing the position that will
be taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue until a contrary adjudication.
2. 49 STAT. 1707, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ i66, 167 (Supp. 1936). Section 166, containing the
most important applicable provisions, reads: "Where at any time the power to revest in the
grantor title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested-() in the grantor, either alone
or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition
of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom . . . then the income of such part of
the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor." The 1934 provisions
are identical. 48 STAT. 729 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 166, 167 (935). The constitutionality
of these provisions was first sustained in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (193o).
3. Two weeks before the instant ruling, an amendment to U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Arts.
166-1, 167-1 [XVI Int. Rev. Bull., No. 37, at 6 (937)] was passed which was obviously
designed to cover the instant situation and reach the instant result. See instant case at 4.
4. See Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 177 (1933).
5. The Chief Counsel, in order to hold that B has a substantial adverse interest in only
his own share of the corpus, dwelt on the use of the words "any part" and "such part" in
§§ 166 and 167. It becomes pertinent, however, to note that these same words were used in
prior Acts where there was no provision as to substantial adverse interest. In the prior Acts
[see e. g., 43 STAT. 277 (1924)] the words clearly had no special significance. It is question-
able whether, by the addition of the "substantial adverse interest" phrase in the Act of 1932,
47 STAT. 221 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ i66, 167 (935), these words were intended to acquire
a new significance. Nor is this purpose indicated in the committee report on the reason for
the substitution. See infra note 7.
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under such a conclusion, it must be maintained that the settlor retains control
over the interests of C, D, and E. But in view of the fact that he can revoke
only with the consent of a beneficiary who has a one-fourth interest, the theory
of his control becomes strained.6 It was to circumvent the possibility of tax
avoidance by placing the power to revoke in the hands of a beneficiary with a
minor or inconsequential interest, that the phrase providing that the income be
taxable to the settlor, if the power to revoke is placed in the hands of a bene-
ficiary who does not have a "substantial adverse interest", was inserted.7 It is
doubtful whether a one-fourth interest falls within the small interest contemplated
by the statute. It would therefore seem that a one-fourth interest is a "sub-
stantial" one, and that the instant situation was not intended to be covered by
the statute. A further question is whether the Chief Counsel was justified in
assuming that B, in every case with the present facts, has an adverse interest
only in his own share and not in the remainder of the corpus." Adversity of
interest is defined as the conflict of interest between the beneficiary and the
settlor.9 It does not seem inevitable that such a conflict between B and the
settlor should exist only insofar as B's own share is involved. Again, a difficulty
results where A reserves the right to revoke with the consent of any one of the
four equal beneficiaries. Under the reasoning of this opinion, three-fourths of
the income is taxable to the settlor. To which beneficiary is the other one-
fourth taxable? 10 In light of these considerations, it seems improbable that the
courts will support the Chief Counsel's application of §§ 166 and 167.
Trusts-Application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to Non-Funded
Insurance Trusts-During his lifetime the settlor, reserving to himself the
power of revocation, created a non-funded I trust of his life insurance policies
for the benefit of himself, his wife and children. The trust was to continue until
each child attained the age of twenty-five, when he was to receive his share of
the principal. At the death of the settlor, a creditor and the trustee both claimed
the proceeds of the policies, whereupon the insurance company brought a bill of
interpleader. The creditor attempted to have the trust overthrown as a violation
of the rule against perpetuities,2 on the ground that the period started upon the
declaration of the trust. Held, that there was no violation of the rule, because
the period in which the interests might vest did not begin until the death of the
6. This position has apparently never before been taken in an income tax case. It has
been suggested, however, in a few cases arising under the Federal Estate Tax, 44 STAT. 71
(936), 26 U. S. C. A. 41xd (1935). See Lit v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. 853 (1933), aff'd,
72 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934); Lowndes, A Day in the Supreme Court with the Fed-
eral Estate Tax (1936) 22 VA. L. REV. 261, 263.
7. H. R. REP. (Financial Committee) No. 665, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1932) 34.
8. Instant opinion at 5.
9. Ibid.
io. Even greater complications might conceivably arise when the four beneficiaries are to
receive substantial but unequal shares of the trust fund. If the income of only three is tax-
able to the settlor, query: which three? See Note (1935) 3o ILL. L. REv. 360, 363, for a dis-
cussion of this situation under the Federal Estate Tax.
i. "In an unfunded trust, while the trustee holds the policies, the creator or settlor pays
the premiums directly to the insurance company .. . " Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of
Life Inmrance (930) 78 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 346.
2. The common law rule against perpetuities is in force in Hawaii. See Fitchie v.
Brown, 18 Hawaii 52, 69 (19o6).
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settlor.3  Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. v. The von Hamm-Young Co.,
Hawaii Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 1937.
The instant case represents the first decision 4 as to whether the rule against
perpetuities applies to a revocable insurance trust 5 upon its creation, or at the
death of a settlor who has retained the power of revocation. The opinion of the
court seems to have been that the future interest created by the settlor, because
of its destructability, should be exempt from application of the rule against
perpetuities as long as the settlor could revoke. Technically, it would seem that
the rule should apply upon the creation of the trust, since an interest is created 6
which might possibly vest later than the period of a life in being and twenty-one
years thereafter. This has been the belief of most of the non-judicial writers.
7
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the court relied on several purportedly
analogous situations. Thus, limitations over after an estate tail,8 and trusts
which are revocable at the will of the beneficiaries 9 have been held valid. Also,
a general power of appointment by will 10 has been held exercisable after the
period of the rule. In addition, the court leaned heavily upon a New York
case 11 which held that the New York statute limiting the suspension of owner-
ship 1' did not apply until the death of the settlor of a revocable trust. Although
the cases are not strictly analogous, 13 there is a strong practical argument in
favor of the result reached by the court. If the period of the rule were held to
start at the creation of the trust, there would be no way in which a settlor could
provide at that time for any future children he might have.14 Clearly a trust of
such a nature is a desirable device. Unhampered by precedents, the Hawaiian
court has enunciated a salutory rule which should be followed in this country.
3. The mere possibility that an interest might vest beyond the limits of the rule is fatal.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 214, and cases cited. Therefore,
had the court in the instant case held that the period began at the time of the creation of the
trust, the trust would have been invalid, because there was the possibility at that time that the
settlor might have a child at a later date.
4. However, the subject has been fully discussed by: Morris, The Rule Against Perpetu-
ities as Applied to Living Trusts (1937) 11 U. OF GIN. L. REv. 327; Note (1932) 45 HARV.
L. REv. 896. See also Hanna, supra. note I, at 358; REmSEN, THE PREPARATION OF WILLS
AND TRUSTS (2d ed. 1930) § 322; SCULLY, INSURANCE TRUSTS (1927) 30. As to the appli-
cability of the rule against perpetuities generally to insurance trusts where the insurance
company is the so-called trustee, see Legis. (1937) 5o HARv. L. REV. 511, 515.
5. Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., no Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929), 73 A.
L. R. 2o9 (1931) ; Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914).
6. Scott, Trusts and The Statute of Wills (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 521, 527; RESTATE-
mENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 84, comment b.
7. REmSEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 321; SCULLY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 31; STEPHEN-
SON, LIVING TRUSTS INCLUDING LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS (1932) 109; Hanna, supra note I,
at 359.
8. Citing GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 203.
9. Citing Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. 635 (1896) which dealt with "... a
new rule required to control the length of time a trusteeship may be continued. . ....
KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS
(2d ed. 1920) § 658.
IO. Citing Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525 (1888). Kales states that although
the power must vest within the period, the power need not then be exercised. KALES, op. cit.
supra note 9, at § 69o.
ii. Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
12. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § II, N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 42, § II. For a
discussion of the application of the New York statute, see Fraser, Personal Life Insurance
Trusts in New York (1930) 16 CORN. L. Q. 19, 28.
13. See supra notes 9, Io. In a revocable trust, the probability is that the settlor will not
revoke, with the result that it is more than likely that he is tying up his property for a period
longer than the rule permits. Morris, supra note 4, at 351.
14. Id. at 354; Note (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 896, 90i; see supra note 3.
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